Category: Uncategorized

  • Design for Execution

    How Constructability Drives Safer, More Cost-Effective HDD Projects

    Written by Thomas Wirbicki

    Horizontal directional drilling (HDD) projects are often treated as a design exercise, focused on geometry, calculations, and compliance. However, project success is not determined on paper; it is determined in the field during execution. Designs that cannot be safely and efficiently constructed introduce additional risk, drive unnecessary cost, and reduce control during execution.

    HDD designs can frequently demonstrate the consequences of overlooking constructability. In one case, a third-party design had advanced to Issue for Construction (IFC) status, but introduced significant safety risks, excessive equipment requirements, and avoidable cost exposure.

    HDD of 36-inch pipe

    Through a targeted design review and redesign, these issues were addressed, resulting in improved constructability, reduced risk, and substantial cost savings. Integrating field experience, constructability awareness, and lifecycle thinking into HDD design leads to safer execution, stronger outcomes, and measurable cost savings.

    A fully developed HDD design had reached IFC status before undergoing a detailed review. While it had been approved by a Professional Engineer, LSC’s evaluation identified approximately 100 issues that directly impacted execution, many already embedded in stamped plans and not apparent to the asset owner.

    A crucial problem was identified: the design could not be built as depicted. Just because a hole can be drilled, doesn’t necessarily mean a pipeline can be safely installed in it.

    When constructability is not addressed during design, risk is transferred to the field where options are limited and corrections are costly.

    Key challenges identified during the review included:

    • No margin for drilling tolerance or field variability
    • Misalignment between tracking capabilities and required steering decisions
    • Insufficient workspace and site access planning
    • An unrealistic installation approach requiring excessive pullback support equipment
    • Misinterpretation of geotechnical data
    • Inaccurate or inconsistent calculations
    • Geometry that introduced safety hazards during installation and operations

    These conditions reduce control in the field, increase safety concerns, and introduce unnecessary complexity, driving delays, rework, and cost escalation.

    The redesign focused on one objective: aligning the design with how the project would actually be built.

    Terrain and subsurface conditions were reevaluated, and it was determined the increased depth would also lower the risk of inadvertent returns (IR) in this scenario. Tolerances related to the design and 3-joint radius were both increased to provide more flexibility to the drilling contractor.

    The installation approach was simplified. Pipe handling strategies were restructured to reduce unsafe practices and reduce unnecessary constraints. The result was a design that could be executed with greater control, lower risk, and improved predictability.

    The redesign produced the following clear, quantifiable benefits.

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    Reduce unsafe pipe handling practices

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    Reduced exposure to elevated and constrained operations

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    Improved overall field safety conditions

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    Simplified installation strategy

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    Increased contractor flexibility through improved tolerances

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    Reduced likelihood of delays, rework, or change orders

    Most engineering teams can complete the required calculations for an HDD crossing, which is an expected capability. The difference lies in whether the design reflects real-world execution.

    All projects should take a constructability-focused approach that aligns design decisions with how work is actually executed in the field. This includes grounding decisions in field conditions, understanding contractor capabilities, building in tolerance for variability, and treating design and construction as a continuous process.

    Key differentiators include:

    + Design for construction: Prioritize how the project will actually be built

    + Field-informed decision-making: Apply real-world experience to anticipate execution challenges

    + Built-in tolerance: Account for variability in drilling conditions and performance

    + Cross-phase integration: Align design, procurement, and construction from the start

    For project owners, this approach is critical. Issues missed during design often surface during construction, when options are limited and costs are higher. A constructability-focused design reduces these risks upfront.

    HDD project success is determined by execution, not design completion. Designs that fail to account for constructability transfer risk to the field, where it is far more difficult and costly to manage.

    By integrating field experience into the design process, project teams can identify risks earlier, simplify installation, and improve control over cost, safety, and schedule.

    The result is a design that does more than meet minimum requirements; it performs under real conditions and delivers predictable outcomes.

  • Protecting Operational Technology Environments Through Physical Security Review

    How LSC Helps Oil and Gas Operators Identify and Reduce Physical Risk to Critical OT Systems

    Written by Lance Caven

    Operational Technology (OT) environments supporting pipeline operations are often evaluated through cybersecurity, network architecture, and process resilience. Physical security is a foundational component of OT cybersecurity, yet it is frequently evaluated separately from broader OT risk management efforts. Even well-designed cybersecurity controls can be undermined when unauthorized individuals gain physical access to critical systems, communications infrastructure, or recovery environments. Effective OT security requires both cyber and physical controls working together to protect operational continuity, resiliency, and recovery performance.

    In remote and distributed pipeline environments, physical vulnerabilities can cause immediate operational disruption, safety risks, and recovery risks, affecting operations, employee safety, and public confidence.

    LSC helps critical infrastructure operators identify and reduce this risk through structured physical security reviews of critical OT facilities, improving failover readiness, strengthening operational continuity, and reducing exposure to safety and regulatory impacts.
    These reviews also help operators prioritize and implement practical improvements by connecting physical conditions to operational, safety, and continuity outcomes. By aligning recommendations with industry guidance and regulatory expectations, operators can strengthen resilience in an actionable, scalable way.

    At a disaster recovery (DR) site, physical security gaps extend beyond unauthorized access, introducing risk to failover readiness and operational continuity. Without appropriate controls and independent supporting infrastructure, such sites may not perform as intended during disruption events.

    A structured review enables operators to identify high-impact vulnerabilities and prioritize practical improvements that reduce risk across their asset base.

    Credible threat actors are not limited to highly sophisticated attackers. Relevant categories include opportunistic intruders, malicious outsiders seeking disruption or theft, insiders or third parties with knowledge of the facility, and more organized threat actors interested in impairing infrastructure operations or resiliency.

    In facilities with weak layered protection, likely threat behaviors include attempts to gain unauthorized access, exploit low-visibility areas, interfere with critical equipment, avoid detection, and target dependencies that affect continuity or recovery. These actions can lead to loss of system visibility, delayed response to abnormal conditions, or disruption of control system availability during critical events.

    This threat model is particularly important for facilities serving a DR function, where physical and infrastructure weaknesses can undermine performance during disruption events. Without independent supporting infrastructure, these vulnerabilities can extend beyond a localized issue and introduce broader risk to continuity and recovery.

    For public-facing purposes, the threat model should remain category-based and consequence-focused rather than site-specific or procedural. This preserves the value of the analysis while avoiding unnecessary disclosure of sensitive facility protection details.

    In practice, these risks often arise from conditions such as disaster recovery facilities that retain dependencies on primary-site infrastructure, OT environments located in shared-use facilities, monitoring systems without defined response procedures, communications equipment exposed to environmental hazards, or access controls that can be bypassed through operational practices. While individually manageable, these conditions can collectively increase operational and cybersecurity risk.

    For a critical OT-supporting pipeline facility, “good” does not mean eliminating all risk. It means reducing the likelihood that a physical or environmental issue will disrupt operation or impair recovery. TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines describe a risk-based approach in which operators apply baseline and enhanced security measures, conduct periodic assessments, and maintain physical security and access controls appropriate to the facility’s criticality. API Standard 1164 similarly emphasizes protecting control-system environments and maintaining resiliency.

    In practical terms, a strong target state for a facility includes clear separation of critical OT spaces from shared or general-access areas through effective barriers and access controls. Access is limited, deliberate, and attributable rather than informal or easily bypassed. Physical access is monitored to support deterrence and timely response.

    A mature environment also protects critical systems from non-intrusion threats such as water exposure, power-related disruption, and other physical or environmental conditions that could impair equipment or continuity. Monitoring is not treated as a passive control; it is paired with defined processes and personnel capable of acting on alerts in real time. This is particularly important where cameras and alerting tools have been added as part of remediation.

    For facilities serving a DR or continuity function, “good” further means that the site can perform its intended role during stress conditions. That requires minimizing unnecessary dependencies on the primary environment, reducing common-mode failure risks, and ensuring communications resilience, including independent connectivity where appropriate. In this context, physical security becomes a critical enabler of recovery performance, not just a protective control.

    Finally, good security posture is visible in governance as well as hardware. The operator can explain how the site was assessed, what criticality assumptions were used, which vulnerabilities were prioritized, what improvements were made, and how the controls will be maintained, reviewed, and tested over time. That is the point at which physical security becomes not just a collection of protective devices, but a credible resilience capability aligned with both regulatory expectations and operational needs.

    Most facilities contain dozens of improvement opportunities but only limited resources. Treating every finding equally can divert attention from vulnerabilities that could create the most significant operational consequences.

    LSC helps operators prioritize remediation efforts by evaluating:

    + Consequence severity

    + Recovery implications

    + Likelihood of occurance

    This risk-based approach enables organizations to focus resources on improvements that deliver the greatest risk reduction while supporting operational objectives and budget constraints.

    Physical security in OT environments is not just about preventing unauthorized entry, it is about reducing the likelihood that a facility weakness will escalate into an operational, safety, environmental, or public-impact event. In oil and gas pipeline operations, critical systems often support functions whose failure can affect employees, contractors, and the broader community. Unauthorized access, equipment tampering, or damage to critical OT assets can lead to operational disruption, safety incidents, environmental consequences, and costly recovery efforts. For that reason, physical hardening and environmental risk reduction should be considered essential parts of OT resilience.

    The addition of continuously staffed monitoring further demonstrates how relatively simple improvements can materially improve both detection capability and response readiness. Enhancements such as strengthened access controls, improved monitoring, and environmental safeguards provide layered protection that helps prevent minor vulnerabilities from becoming significant operational events.

    For many operators, the next step is to perform a structured physical security assessment of critical or high-risk OT facilities, establish a prioritized remediation roadmap, and integrate monitoring and resiliency improvements into ongoing operational planning. Because facilities often contain numerous improvement opportunities, prioritization is essential to focus resources on the vulnerabilities that present the greatest operational, cybersecurity, safety, or environmental risk.

    A structured physical security assessment provides operators with a clear, prioritized roadmap to strengthen OT facility resilience. By integrating physical security, cybersecurity, operational continuity, and recovery considerations into a single risk-based evaluation, operators can focus resources where they will have the greatest impact. This type of review also supports broader alignment with evolving federal pipeline security expectations.

    LSC helps clients identify where physical and environmental weaknesses create unnecessary operational risk and implement practical improvements that strengthen protection without disrupting field operations. Drawing on experience across OT cybersecurity, industrial control systems, pipeline engineering, integrity management, corrosion control, and operational risk management, LSC evaluates physical security through the lens of pipeline operations and OT resiliency. This approach helps organizations connect security findings to real-world operational consequences, prioritize improvements, and achieve a practical target state in which critical OT facilities are layered, monitored, resilient, and capable of supporting continuity when needed most.